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SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: BUSINESS
EXPERIENCE AND ACCESS TO CORPORATE
RECORDS REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE
OFFERING EXEMPTION
In Lively v. Hirschfeld' the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that the sale of securities to offerees who possessed neither
"exceptional business experience" nor regular access to corporate
records did not qualify for the private offering exemption under
section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.2 Hirschfeld, the sole
stockholder of the Wun Drop Company, sold 8,000 out of 50,000
outstanding shares of the company to one business and to
approximately twenty-five individuals in four states between
September 8, 1967 and April 3, 1968. No registration statement was
filed with the SEC. Several of these purchasers brought suit under
section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,3 seeking rescission of the
sales on the ground that they were effected under an unregistered
public offering. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding
that the offerees were sophisticated and educated, and that their
relationships to the defendants gave them access to such information
as would have been revealed by a registration statement. The court
also found no evidence that the defendants withheld from the offerees
any information which, if learned, would have caused an experienced
investor to reject the offer.4 The court of appeals, holding that the
buyers were neither sufficiently experienced in business affairs nor
adequately informed of the company's financial status, rendered
judgment for the plaintiffs. 5
1. 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971), revg 308 F. Supp. 612 (D. Colo. 1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), amending Securities Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 4(1),
48 Stat. 77. Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act, pertaining to private offerings, was renumbered § 4(2)
by the Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 12,78 Stat. 565,580, and declares:
The provisions of section 77e tbarring unregistered securities from interstate commerce
and the mails] shall not apply to
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970):
Any person who-1) offers or sells a security in violation of § 77e of this title...
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue. . . to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount
of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he
no longer owns the security.
4. 308 F. Supp. at 614.
5. 440 F.2d 631, 633.
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The legislative intent underpinning the 1933 Act is aptly
summarized by its preamble:
An Act to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold
in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent
frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.'
While the Act releases several types of transactions from its
registration requirements, one of the most significant classifications
exempted has been the private offering.7 Private offerings were left
undefined in the legislation, although the historical background of
the Act suggests that this exemption was primarily intended to cover
transactions involving a few insiders having a close relationship to
a company in its early development.8 Others making frequent use of
the private offering have been banks, mutual funds, and insurance
companies.' In recent years the increased use of the private placement
to obtain venture capital and equity financing'0 has resulted in a series
of cases and SEC releases that have hammered out the contours of
the exemption."
The landmark case outlining the requirements of the private
placement exemption was SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,12 in which the
Supreme Court held that a company's sale of its stock to some five
hundred employees failed to qualify for the exemption. Ralston had
claimed that it was engaged in a private placement because it limited
its offer to certain "key employees," defining them not by position
on the organizational chart, but rather in terms of promotion
potential, influence among their peers, and sympathy to
management.13 The Court rejected Ralston's standard and supplied
one of its own:
6. 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
7. Steffen, Private Placements Should Be Registered, 43 N.C.L. Rv. 548,549 (1965):
tTlhe dollar value of industrial issues placed privately . . . has exceeded that of the
issues registered and sold publicly in every year since 1942.
See also Cohan, Should Private Placements Be Registered?, 43 N.C.L. REv. 298,301-06 (1965).
8. NEw YORK CITY PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 22 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr. & D. Glazer eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
PLI].
9. PLI 22; Cohan, supra note 7, at 309.
10. PLI 22. The practice grew up in the 1950's and 1960's.
11. See Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 2770,
for a discussion of the factors used by the SEC in determining whether an offer qualifies for
the exemption. See also Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 882-85 (D.C. Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
for a discussion of several leading cases.
12. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
13. Id. at 121-22. Their reluctance to define "key employees" in terms of their
organizational chart was understandable in view of the fact that the employees participating
included chow-loading foremen, bakers, and stenographers.
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The natural way to interpret the private offering exemption is in light of the
statutory purpose. Since exempt transactions are those as to which there is
no practical need for the bill's application, the applicability of § 4(1) should
turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection
of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves
is a transaction not involving a public offering."
Apparently in an effort to clarify this classification scheme, the Court
suggested that an offering restricted to highly placed executives might
be considered a private placement. Yet where the offerees' positions
did not afford them regular access to the sort of information which
would be disclosed by registration, they must be provided with such
information. 5 The Court rejected any rule-of-thumb number as a
basis for classifying an offering, but conceded that the SEC might
find "some kind of numerical test" useful in determining which
claims to investigate.1 6 Judicial construction, 7 administrative
interpretation, 8 and scholarly analysis19 of the Ralston standard have
been plentiful and, occasionally, biting.2  In describing the
requirements of the private offering, the Court introduced, but left
14. Id. at 124-25.
15. Id. at 125-26. See United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678
n.2 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967), for a list of such information.
16. 346 U.S. at 125. See also 1 L. Loss, SECuRITIES REGULATION 664 (2d ed. 1961):
[l]t seems relatively safe to assume that an offering to not more than twenty-five persons
will be considered exempt-at least so far as Commission intervention as distinct from
civil liability under § 12(l) is concerned....
17. Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 882-85 (D.C. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), discusses the
facts and holdings in five other leading post-Ralston cases.
18. See note 11 supra. See also SEC Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970), 1 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 1 2784, at 2687; SEC Release No. 7935 (Aug. 10, 1966), [1966-67 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,402, at 82,712; SEC Release No. 7000 (Jan..23, 1963), [1961-
64 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,895, at 81,306. See generally I CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 2707-2850, at 2673-2702.
19. See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 653-87; Harrison, Thirty-Eight Years
Without Definiaion-The Private Offering Exemption, 24 ARK. L. REv. 417 (1971); Orrick,
Some Observations on the Administration of the Securities Laws, 42 MINN. L. REv. 25 (1957);
Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under
the Federal Securities Act, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1959); Victor & Bedrick, Private Offerings:
Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. -Rv. 869 (1959). See the following case notes for initial
reactions to Ralston: 4 CATH. U.L. REv. 70-73 (1954); 52 MICH. L. REv. 298-300 (1953); 48
Nw. U.L. REv. 771-77 (1954); 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 113-18 (1953); 3 UTAH L. REv. 519-21
(1953).
20. See, e.g., lsraels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. REv.
851, 852-53 (1959) (accusing the Court of definitional vagueness). See also Sargent, Private
Offering Exemption, 21 Bus. LAw. 118, 119-20 (1965):
[A]nybody that has been through the registration process ... knows full well that no
matter what information an issuer may supply to any investor, absent registration, it
could not possibly be comparable to that which comes out of the registration process.
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undefined, the investors who are "able to fend for themselves" and
the concept of "access." Reference to the former has opened the door
to the argument that where sophisticated investors are the offerees,
the exemption is satisfied.2 1 The problem of access has usually been
resolved by examining the relationship between the parties for
evidence that the offeree has had a reasonable opportunity to discover
sufficient information about the offering company to permit an
intelligent investment decision.2 The relationship between access and
sophistication has been treated in several ways by the courts.2 It has
been held that sophisticated investors, particularly institutional ones,
have sufficient bargaining power to extract from the issuer all of the
information required to make an intelligent investment decision.2 4 It
has also been suggested that the putative private offeree must either
be sophisticated or he must be afforded access to such information
as would be revealed by a registration statement.2 5 A third
interpretation has required that the investor in a private placement
be granted access to such information no matter how sophisticated
he might be. 2 All three interpretations are possible readings of
Ralston, but the third one, strictly construed, could seriously erode
the utility of the private placement. The first and second views merely
echo the Supreme Court's suggestion that those investors who are
sophisticated can and do fend for themselves, and therefore do not
need the protection of the Act. If, on the other hand, the third
interpretation is the correct statement of the law, then companies
wishing to make use of private offerings must prepare and submit
to all prospective purchasers, even including large institutional
investors, most of the information which would have been contained
in the very registration statement whose "flyspecking" rigors they
were trying to avoid.
21. This argument was successfully urged in Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-66
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,523, at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), but was
rejected in United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967).
22. See Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963) for a detailed discussion of
factors tending to show a close relationship, and as a result, access to necessary information.
23. PLI 40 n.32.
24. See, e.g., Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sec.
L. REP. T 91,523, at 94, 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
25. See, e.g., Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261,265 (D. Colo. 1965).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir.
1967).
27. Sargent, supra note 20, at 120. See note 20 for the view that nothing short ofregistration
satisfies the Ralston standard. See also PLI 42 for an example of misuse ofinformation released
in support of a private placement, and Steffen and Cohan, supra note 7, for an exchange of
broadsides as to whether the public interest would be better served by registration of all
securities, or whether the Act should be re-written to protect only those who seek its protection.
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held, in Lively v.
Hirschfeld, that the Ralston definition of a private group embraced
only persons having exceptional business experience and having posi-
tions giving them regular access to all data necessary to determine the
status and potential of the corporation.Y The court noted that the de-
fendants had put only one of the plaintiff-offerees on the stand, an
airline pilot with "considerable business experience," who had been
an occasional purchaser of stocks.2 - He had been given some informa-
tion about the corporate structure of Wun Drop, but by no means as
much as would have been revealed by a registration statement. The
other purchasers did not take the stand, but according to defense
testimony, they were educated friends and acquaintances of some
business background who had received some information about the
company.A0 The court found that even the most sophisticated and best
informed purchaser, the pilot, lacked either the exceptional degree of
investment experience or the regular access to information about the
company-both of which it read Ralston to require. That the other
purchasers did not pass this new conjuncti;e test followed easily.
Although it is too soon to say what Lively v. Hirschfeld's exact
effect on the private placement exemption will be, the loophole from
registration provided by the private offering may now be smaller. The
requirement that the private offeree both be exceptionally experienced
and have regular access is on its face more stringent than the
standards of at least two other circuits. In Gilligan, Will & Co. v.
SEC31 the second circuit's construction of private offering
requirements did not mention sophistication as a requirement at all;
the decision was bottomed solely on the issue of access.32 In United
States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp.,3 the fourth circuit held only
that sophistication was no substitute for access, failing to deal with
the issue of the unsophisticated investor. 3' The rationale of Lively may
have arisen from reading the Ralston and Custer standards in
combination. The argument proceeds in three steps. If "(a]n offering
to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a
transaction not involving 'a public offering,"3' then, arguably, an
28. 440 F.2d at 633.
29. Id. at 632.
30. Id.
31. 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
32. Id. at 466.
33. 376 F.2d 675.
34. Id. at 678.
35. 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
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offering to the unsophisticated is ipso facto public. But if Custer is
taken literally, then there must be complete access for even the
sophisticated investor. Private offerings, therefore, cannot be made
to anyone who is not sophisticated and fully informed of the financial
condition of the issuing company. It is .submitted that this line of
reasoning, with its implication that the issuer has the duty to assume
the initiative of fully informing all prospective customers-no matter
how sophisticated-is of questionable validity. A sounder holding was
reached in Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus,31 in which a large mutual
fund, after suffering sharp losses, sought rescission of a purchase of
unregistered stock. The Value Line Fund argued, as did the plaintiffs
in Lively, that they did not have sufficient access to the company's
records to make an informed investment decision. The court's
rejection of this argument was emphatic: "[T]he offerees possessed
enough sophistication to demand and enough leverage at the
bargaining table to receive"37 sufficient information. Failure to
investigate adequately was not to be "twisted into any valid claim
that the plaintiffs did not have access to information, or were not
in a position to fend for themselves." 38 The court added that an
insistence that all offerees in a private placement have positions
affording them access to corporate records might shut off the offering
to all but the issuer's key employees, thus excluding institutional
investors altogether. 3 An alternative equally disheartening to the
issuing company would be to force it to prepare and submit
constantly updated prospectuses, replete with the details required for
public offerings, to all prospective purchasers. The pragamatism of
the Value Line approach to what really goes on in the private
placement market is consistent with the Supreme Court's strong
suggestion in Ralston that sophisticated investors do not need the
protection of the Act. Lively's conjunctive requirement of
sophistication and access would totally exclude all unsophisticated
investors, even unsophisticated key employees, from private offerings,
no matter how much they might know about the issuing company.
As for the experienced investors, the drawbacks to Lively's insistence
that they have full access to such information as would accompany
a registered offering have been noted. What Value Line makes clear
36. [1964-66 l'ransrer Binder] CCH FED. Sec. L. Rep. 91,523, at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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is that the tenth circuit's protection of experienced investors is not
only bothersome, but unnecessary, since it extends the protective
wings of Custer and Ralston over sophisticated institutional investors
as well as those naive individuals making their first purchase of
securities.
Lively v. Hirschfeld also raises some troublesome definitional
questions in an area of law already justly criticized for its murky
language." Is the tenth circuit's requirement that investors in private
placements be "exceptionally experienced" synonymous with
"sophisticated," or is it more stringent? Moreover, at what point in
his career does an investor leave the zone of "considerable
experience" of the airline pilot in Lively and reach the area of
"exceptional experience" required by the tenth circuit? These
distinctions may not be as significant as they first appear, inasmuch
as the court may have meant only that the purchasers before it were
not sophisticated enough to fend for themselves, but whether real or
imagined, this apparent shift in classification is likely to raise more
questions than it answers. A former commissioner of the SEC,
discussing abuses of the private offering exemption, observed that "to
a certain extent some chickens have been getting under the fence in
recent years. t41 The tenth circuit, by hardening its tone, and perhaps
altering its requirements, may be attempting to do nothing more than
mend that fence. Nevertheless, by strengthening the gloss put on
Ralston by Custer, and by its use of somewhat ambiguous language,
the opinion in Lively v. Hirschfeld may be remembered more for its
in terrorem effects on would-be issuers of unregistered securities than
for its predictive value.
40. See note 20supra.
41. Sargent, supra note 20, at 118.
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